The final report of “The Kay Rcview of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making” has been published today. The final report is here and the associated BIS press release is here. Professor Kay’s speech – with its emphasis that those engaged in the equity investment chain should operate to fiduciary standards – launching the report is here.
Professor Kay was asked by the Business Secretary in June 2011 to review whether the UK equity markets give sufficient support to “their core purpose of enhancing the performance of UK companies and providing returns to savers”. His answer is a pretty resounding “no”:
“…we conclude that short-termism is a problem in UK equity markets, and that the principal causes are the decline of trust and the misalignment of incentives throughout the equity investment chain”.
The report sets out principles “designed to provide a foundation for a long-term perspective in UK equity markets and describe the directions in which regulatory policy and market practice should move”, and then specific recommendations aimed at “providing the first steps towards the re-establishment of equity markets that work well for their users”.
Kay Review Principles
“1. All participants in the equity investment chain should act according to the principles of stewardship, based on respect for those whose funds are invested or managed, and trust in those by whom the funds are invested or managed.
2. Relationships based on trust and respect are everywhere more effective than trading transactions between anonymous agents in promoting high performance of companies and securing good returns to savers taken as a whole.
3. Asset managers can contribute more to the performance of British business (and in consequence to overall returns to their savers) through greater involvement with the companies in which they invest.
4. Directors are stewards of the assets and operations of their business. The duties of company directors are to the company, not its share price, and companies should aim to develop relationships with investors, rather than with ‘the market’.
5. All participants in the equity investment chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their clients and customers. Fiduciary standards require that the client’s interests are put first, that conflict of interest should be avoided, and that the direct and indirect costs of services provided should be reasonable and disclosed. These standards should not require, nor even permit, the agent to depart from generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour. Contractual terms should not claim to override these standards.
6. At each stage of the equity investment chain, reporting of performance should be clear, relevant, timely, related closely to the needs of users and directed to the creation of long-term value in the companies in which savers’ funds are invested.
7. Metrics and models used in the equity investment chain should give information directly relevant to the creation of long-term value in companies and good risk adjusted long-term returns to savers.
8. Risk in the equity investment chain is the failure of companies to meet the reasonable expectations of their stakeholders or the failure of investments to meet the reasonable expectations of savers. Risk is not short-term volatility of return, or tracking error relative to an index benchmark, and the use of measures and models which rely on such metrics should be discouraged.
9. Market incentives should enable and encourage companies, savers and intermediaries to adopt investment approaches which achieve long-term returns by supporting and challenging corporate decisions in pursuit of long-term value.
10. The regulatory framework should enable and encourage companies, savers and intermediaries to adopt such investment approaches.”
Kay Review Recommendations
“1. The Stewardship Code should be developed to incorporate a more expansive form of stewardship, focussing on strategic issues as well as questions of corporate governance.
2. Company directors, asset managers and asset holders should adopt Good Practice Statements that promote stewardship and long-term decision making. Regulators and industry groups should takes steps to align existing standards, guidance and codes of practice with the Review’s Good Practice Statements.
3. An investors’ forum should be established to facilitate collective engagement by investors in UK companies.
4. The scale and effectiveness of merger activity of and by UK companies should be kept under careful review by BIS and by companies themselves.
5. Companies should consult their major long-term investors over major board appointments.
6. Companies should seek to disengage from the process of managing short term earnings expectations and announcements.
7. Regulatory authorities at EU and domestic level should apply fiduciary standards to all relationships in the investment chain which involve discretion over the investments of others, or advice on investment decisions. These obligations should be independent of the classification of the client, and should not be capable of being contractually overridden.
8. Asset managers should make full disclosure of all costs, including actual or estimated transaction costs, and performance fees charged to the fund.
9. The Law Commission should be asked to review the legal concept of fiduciary duty as applied to investment to address uncertainties and misunderstandings on the part of trustees and their advisers.
10. All income from stock lending should be disclosed and rebated to investors.
11. Mandatory IMS (quarterly reporting) obligations should be removed.
12. High quality, succinct narrative reporting should be strongly encouraged.
13. The Government and relevant regulators should commission an independent review of metrics and models employed in the investment chain to highlight their uses and limitations.
14. Regulators should avoid the implicit or explicit prescription of a specific model in valuation or risk assessment and instead encourage the exercise of informed judgment.
15. Companies should structure directors’ remuneration to relate incentives to sustainable long-term business performance. Long-term performance incentives should be provided only in the form of company shares to be held at least until after the executive has retired from the business.
16. Asset management firms should similarly structure managers’ remuneration so as to align the interests of asset managers with the interests and timescales of their clients. Pay should therefore not be related to short-term performance of the investment fund or asset management firm. Rather a long-term performance incentive should be provided in the form of an interest in the fund (either directly or via the firm) to be held at least until the manager is no longer responsible for that fund.
17. The Government should explore the most cost effective means for individual investors to hold shares directly on an electronic register.”
Summary from launch speech
In launching his report, Professor Kay summarised the central themes of his recommendations:
“the need for a simpler, shorter, less costly equity investment chain based on relationships of trust and confidence rather than transactions and trading
• the importance of aligning incentives at each of these stages with the imperatives of good long term decision making
• the need for regulation which focuses on structure and incentives rather than the complex rule making, and adopt the perspective of the end users of markets rather than the market participants”.
Next steps
The recommendations will now be considered by BIS, with a detailed response expected later in 2012.
See also: Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Interim report published
Kay Review: Explanatory speech and call for evidence
The Enlightened Shareholder: Clarifying investors’ fiduciary duties
Transparency Directive reform: Interim Management Statements to be abolished?
